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People often use spatial vocabulary to describe temporal relations, and this increasingly has
motivated attempts to map spatial frames of reference (FoRs) onto time. Recent research
suggested that speech communities, which differ in how they conceptualize space, may
also differ in how they conceptualize time and, more specifically, that the preferences for
spatial FoRs should carry over to the domain of time. Here, we scrutinize this assumption
(a) by reviewing data from recent studies on temporal references, (b) by comparing data
we had collected in previous studies on preferences for spatial and temporal FoRs in four
languages, (c) by analyzing new data from dynamic spatial tasks that resemble the tem-
poral tasks more closely, and (d) by assessing the co-variation of individual preferences
of English speakers across space and time. While the first set of data paints a mixed pic-
ture, the latter three do not support the assumption of a close link between referencing
preferences across domains. We explore possible reasons for this lack of consistency and
discuss implications for research on temporal references.
Keywords: frames of reference, space, time, cross-linguistic comparison (German, English, Chinese, Tongan),
dynamic settings
INTRODUCTION
Space and time are closely linked – not only in physics, but also in
lay people’s descriptions and conceptualizations, and maybe even
in the computational mechanisms of the brain. For instance, when
we talk about time, we tend to use spatial vocabulary (e.g., Clark,
1973; Bennett, 1975; Traugott, 1975, 1978; Miller and Johnson-
Laird, 1976). When we reason about time, temporal representa-
tions may be affected by spatial primes (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001;
Gentner et al., 2002), by spatially defined response modes (Tor-
ralbo et al., 2006; Weger and Pratt, 2008), or by primes based on
imagined or fictive motion (Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Mat-
lock et al., 2005). Moreover, time, space, and quantity appear to be
part of a generalized magnitude system (Walsh, 2003), and tem-
poral relations tend to be mapped onto and to be computed in
terms of spatial representations (Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008;
Casasanto et al., 2010).
Consequently, speech communities that differ with regard to
how they conceptualize space should also differ in their concep-
tualization of time. A promising way of assessing differences in
spatial conceptualization is by assessing preferences in frames
of reference. A frame of reference (FoR) is a coordinate sys-
tem required to describe the relation between objects from a
given perspective. The taxonomy proposed by Levinson (2003)
distinguishes three main types – absolute, intrinsic, and rela-
tive – and speakers of different languages have been shown to
differ with regard to which FoRs they habitually and/or prefer-
entially use (Senft, 1997; Bennardo, 2002; Levinson, 2003; Majid
et al., 2004; Haun et al., 2006, 2011; Dasen and Mishra, 2010).
Whether these distinct preferences also entail cognitive impli-
cations is a matter of on-going dispute (Levinson et al., 2002;
vs. Li and Gleitman, 2002; and see Haun et al., 2011; Li et al.,
2011). The question we are interested in is whether these pref-
erences for a specific FoR in the spatial domain carry over to
the temporal domain and, if so, how strong this conceptual
link is.
CULTURAL VARIABILITY IN SPACE-TIME MAPPING
Recent attempts to systematically map taxonomies of spatial FoRs
onto the temporal domain yielded a variety of accounts (e.g., Ben-
der et al., 2005, 2010; Kranjec, 2006; Moore, 2006, 2011; Núñez
et al., 2006; Zinken, 2010; Tenbrink, 2011; Yu, 2012), but are far
from converging. In line with these theoretical disputes, empirical
studies also paint a mixed picture.
Usage of an absolute FoR in time (with past in the East and
future in the West), for instance, has been observed in card
arrangement tasks by members of a Pormpuraaw Aboriginal
speech community speaking Kuuk Thaayorre, who also prefer the
absolute FoR to organize spatial representations (Boroditsky and
Gaby, 2010). Likewise, the Yupno in Papua New Guinea prefer an
absolute FoR in both spatial and temporal descriptions, indicating
past events by downhill gestures, and future events by uphill ges-
tures (Núñez et al., 2012). Matters are more complicated for Tzeltal
Maya speech communities, which prefer an absolute FoR (along
the downhill/uphill axis) for spatial descriptions. Occasionally,
they also equate uphill with the future, however less consistently
so (Brown, 2012).
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The concern that spatial FoRs per se may not be the only rel-
evant factor for temporal references is also indicated by findings
that establish strong correlations between the prevailing writing
direction1, and a temporal representation in form of a mental
time line: left to right in English speakers, right to left in Hebrew
and Arabic speakers (Tversky et al., 1991; Fuhrman and Borodit-
sky, 2010), and top-down in Chinese speakers (Boroditsky et al.,
2011; Bergen and Chan Lau, 2012).
The primacy of space as the source domain for conceptual-
izing time has been disputed more generally on other grounds
as well. The claim, for instance, that speakers of Mandarin Chi-
nese make more frequent use of vertical spatial metaphors for
time than English speakers and are therefore more likely to also
think about time in a vertical manner (Boroditsky, 2001), gave
rise to an on-going debate (for disconfirmation, see Chen, 2007;
January and Kako, 2007; Tse and Altarriba, 2008; for confirmative
evidence, see Boroditsky et al., 2011; Fuhrman et al., 2011; Miles
et al., 2011), which has not been settled yet (see the review by
Chen and O’Seaghdha, in press). Speakers of Yucatec Maya, who
are habitual users of an absolute FoR in space and who refer to
locations and directions by precise (horizontal) gestures (Le Guen,
2011), avoid mappings of temporal entities onto any of these hor-
izontal locations and directions; instead they tend to point toward
the ground for the here and now and toward the sky for distant
past or future events (Le Guen and Pool Balam, 2012). In the case
of Aymara, the question of what one can know (due to personal
experience) seems to provide the basic motivation of a front-to-
past mapping (Núñez and Sweetser, 2006). And the Amazonian
Amondawa are reported to completely lack space-time mappings
even at the constructional linguistic level (Sinha et al., 2011). These
studies lend support to theoretical claims (e.g., by Galton, 2011)
that not all attributes of time can be mapped onto space, and that
some speech communities may entirely refrain from relating their
temporal conceptions to spatial ones.
Even in cases, where space-time mappings were observed, they
need not be mediated by a straightforward linguistic mapping.
Thaayorre, for instance, do not speak of the future as “westwards”
(Gaby, 2012). Yupno has isolated expressions with overlapping
spatial and temporal meanings, but not in a systematic manner
(Núñez et al., 2012). And Tzeltal provides a wide range of spatial
expressions that can be mapped onto time, thus giving rise to a
wide range of temporal representations, as reflected in responses
to the card arrangement task mentioned above (Brown, 2012). The
cases of Kuuk Thaayorre and Yupno therefore provide support for
the assumption that a specific FoR (here: the absolute FoR) may
be transferred from space to time – solely or primarily on the basis
of the underlying principle (here: by deriving orientation from the
superordinate field).
Tzeltal and Amondawa, on the other hand, indicate that such
a transfer of principles need not be the case. Given the incom-
plete linguistic correspondence across domains, however, these
languages cannot be taken as evidence against a stringent map-
ping of spatial FoRs onto temporal contexts. A stronger case for
1Some scholars classify the spatial orientation encoded in writing/reading direction
as an example of an absolute FoR (e.g., Kranjec, 2006), but as this direction is not
used to organize spatial references more generally, it is not considered here.
investigating the transfer of FoR preferences across domains would
be provided by languages that do contain similar expressions for
spatial and temporal sequencing. In other words, if front for these
expressions were assigned in time according to the same princi-
ple as it is assigned in space (i.e., with the same FoR), then one
could safely assume a strong conceptual link between spatial and
temporal representations. A paradigmatic task that has been used
to scrutinize this link is the Wednesday’s meeting task, as will be
explained in the next section.
MOVING FORWARD: TEMPORAL REFERENCES IN DYNAMIC
SETTINGS
When confronted with the question “Next Wednesday’s meeting
has been moved forward 2 days. What day is the meeting now?”
roughly half of USA-American participants respond with Friday,
the other half with Monday (e.g., McGlone and Harding, 1998).
ACCOUNTS OF THE AMBIGUITY IN “MOVING FORWARD”
The ambiguity inherent in the “moving forward” expression has
been attributed to the fact that time can be conceptualized by
adopting one of two perspectives (Clark, 1973; McGlone and
Harding, 1998; Evans, 2003): the Moving Ego (ME) perspective
takes Ego as approaching future events and leaving them behind;
the forward-movement would thus be interpreted as futurewards
(i.e., to Friday). The complementary Moving Time (MT ) perspec-
tive takes future events as approaching Ego and passing by; the
forward-movement would thus be interpreted as pastwards (to
Monday). These perspectives can be primed not only by tem-
poral, but also by spatial stimuli (McGlone and Harding, 1998;
Boroditsky, 2000; Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Gentner et al.,
2002), indicating a conceptual link between spatial and temporal
representations.
Alternatively, people’s readings of the“moving forward”expres-
sion can also be explained from a theoretical perspective that
focuses on temporal FoRs analogous to the FoRs used for space
(cf. Bender et al., 2010; Rothe-Wulf et al., under review). From
this perspective, the ambiguity of “moving X forward” arises
from the fact that this expression is inherently underspecified: in
order to determine the direction of the forward-movement, one
has to assign a front to the constellation – both in space and
time – but the section, to which front is assigned, depends on
the adopted FoR, again both in space and time (see also Moore,
2011).
Typically, spatial FoRs have been described for static settings
(e.g., Levinson, 2003). However, they can easily be transferred to
dynamic descriptions while largely retaining their structure. As in
static settings, the main relation to be established in dynamic set-
tings is that between a figure F and a ground G (in reference to
which F is located). The only difference is that, whereas in static
settings F and G are two distinct entities, in dynamic settings G is
the original position of the entity, and F is the position to which
this entity is moved (cf. Figure 1).
The absolute FoR (Figure 1A) may be the least likely to be
associated with expressions of “moving forward,” as it typically
involves bearings that are linked to geographical landmarks like
cardinal directions or the uphill/downhill gradient. In some cases,
however, one of these geographical bearings is privileged and may
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FIGURE 1 | Moving the object “forward” from its original position (G)
toward the new position (F) according to different frames of reference
(FoRs): the absolute FoR (A), the intrinsic FoR (B), and the three
variants of the relative FoR (C), (D), and (E). Note: The array is depicted
from above. G is colored black, F white, and the observer gray (gaze
direction is indicated by the tip of the nose). The thick gray arrow indicates
the movement of F from is original position G to the new position. Left is
indicated by L, right by R, the origo of the coordinate systems by X, and
their (acquired) FRONT by the tip of the thin arrow. In the relative FoRs, the
primary coordinate system (X 1) originates in Ego, the secondary coordinate
system (origo X 2 =G) is obtained (C) by translation into G, (D) by reflection
in G, or (E) by rotation in G.
thus become the front of the superordinate field. In some cultural
contexts, for instance, this is East (as the very term “orientation”
indicates), in others it is the direction in which Mecca is located,
and for the Aymara it is where the sun rises (Núñez and Cornejo,
2012). Another option for assigning front in an absolute FoR is
described by Talmy (2000): when entities are part of a sequence,
like people waiting in a queue, the whole sequence can be seen
as an “encompassive secondary reference object” (in contrast to
the single entities which are conceptualized as the “primary refer-
ence object”) and are treated, in some accounts, as the field for an
absolute FoR. In this case, front is derived from alignment in the
sequence and/or moving direction, which overrides the (possible)
orientation of the single entities (Talmy, 2000).
The two basic FoRs that are more typically invoked by
“forward”-expressions are the intrinsic FoR and the relative FoR,
and they are distinguished by whether or not the viewpoint
of an observer (V) is also considered. For the intrinsic FoR
(Figure 1B), this viewpoint is irrelevant; however, the FoR can
only be adopted if the object to be moved has an intrinsic
front already assigned to one side (e.g., the front of a car).
front and forward motion are then projected onto the section
of space pertinent to this side (i.e., a car’s canonical driving
direction).
Under a relative FoR, assignment of front is derived from V
(i.e., the observer’s face). How this front is then projected onto the
object to determine the direction of its forward motion depends
on which variant of the relative FoR the speaker chooses: transla-
tion, reflection, or rotation. In the case of translation, front and
forward motion are projected in gaze direction of V onto the space
beyond G (Figure 1C), in the case of reflection and rotation, they
are projected onto the space between V and G (Figures 1D,E). The
distinction of reflection and rotation requires the left-right axis,
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Table 1 | Direction of “forward” in dynamic settings depending on the FoRs in space and time (with G referring to the ground object).
FoR Abstract principle In space In time
Past events Future events
Absolute Into the direction of the
superordinate field
FRONT of the (spatial) field
(e.g., east/eastwards)
FRONT of the (temporal) field: the arrow of time= futurewards
Intrinsic Into the direction of G’s
FRONT
G’s (spatial) FRONT G’s (temporal) FRONT: before its beginning=pastwards
Relative: translation Away from the deictic
center (=further)
Away from observer V
(=further)
Away from now (=further)
=pastwards
Away from now
(=further) =futurewards
Relative: reflection
(rotation)
Toward the deictic center
(=nearer)
Toward observer V
(=nearer)
Toward now (=nearer)
=futurewards
Toward now (=nearer)
=pastwards
which has no temporal counterpart; for this reason, the reflec-
tion and rotation variant will be collapsed in the following. For
more detailed descriptions, see also Beller et al. (under review)
and Levinson (2003).
Crucially, this taxonomy of FoRs holds regardless of whether
the constellation to be described is a spatial array of objects (Levin-
son, 2003; Beller et al., under review) or a temporal array of events
(cf. Bender et al., 2010; Rothe-Wulf et al., under review), allow-
ing for the analysis of whether the preferred temporal reading of
“moving forward” reflects the preferred spatial reading within a
speech community (cf. Table 1).
The characterization of the absolute FoR as depicted here
depends on whether “front” and “forward” can be defined for the
superordinate field (outside figure, ground, and observer). In the
spatial domain, this is most often not the case (as in English, where
cardinal directions are used instead). For the Aymara, however,
Eastwards is the privileged orientation of the spatial field (Núñez
and Cornejo, 2012), and may thus afford a “forward” direction.
In contrast, matters are less complicated for the temporal domain,
as the directionality of time itself provides this orientation. Most
languages under scrutiny here take the arrow of time as pointing
toward the future, and this is where front is assigned to. Events
“in front of” other events or “moved forward” from their previous
position would thus be further in the future under an absolute
temporal reading (for the reversed conception of time in Mala-
gasy, Toba, and Aymara, in which front is assigned to the past, see
Klein, 1987; Dahl, 1995; Núñez and Sweetser, 2006, respectively).
An intrinsic FoR, in contrast, derives its orientation from the
ground entity G (events in the temporal domain), whose intrinsic
front is their beginning: front is thus assigned to the time before
the beginning of event G. Accordingly, events “in front of” other
events or “moved forward” from their previous position would be
in the past of the original date.
A relative FoR, finally, requires a ternary relation between figure
F, ground G, and observer V. Crucially, it emerges as either one of
two different (and in fact opposed) variants: in the reflection vari-
ant, front is assigned to the time between G and V (i.e., nearer
to V), whereas in the translation variant, front is assigned to the
time beyond G (i.e., further away from V). In either case, events
are localized symmetrically in one’s past and future, and thus with
diverging fronts and backs.
Table 2 | Most frequently adopted FoRs in the four investigated
countries for space (Beller et al., under review) and time (Bender
et al., 2010).
Domain Country
Germany USA China Tonga
Space Reflection Reflection Translation Translation
Time Intrinsic Absolute/intrinsic Intrinsic No clear
preference
INVESTIGATION OF FORS ACROSS DOMAINS: A RE-ANALYSIS OF
PREVIOUS FINDINGS
In two previous studies we had assessed which spatial FoRs (s-
FoRs) speakers of German, USA-English, Mandarin Chinese, and
Tongan use for the description of relationships between objects
(Beller et al., under review), and which temporal FoRs (t-FoRs)
speakers of these languages use for moving an event (Bender et al.,
2010). In the spatial tasks, participants were presented with 12
depictions of spatial layouts, and were asked to identify the posi-
tion of F in reference to G. In the temporal tasks, four events were
described that had been moved forward, either in the past or in the
future. They were then asked to specify the date or time, to which
the event had been moved. Both for the spatial and the temporal
tasks, responses were categorized in terms of FoRs according to the
above described principles. In almost all cases, different FoRs are
preferred for spatial than for temporal descriptions (see Table 2).
May this incongruence be taken as strong evidence against a
(close) link between spatial and temporal references, and thus
indicate incongruence across domains, or could it otherwise be
accounted for?
The principle according to which we classified the response pat-
terns in the temporal tasks as temporal FoRs were derived from
a thorough conceptual analysis for future events (or, more pre-
cisely, for events regarded as in front of speakers). For past events,
however, the classification rests on the assumption that people do
re-orient to events in their back by way of rotation2 (Bender et al.,
2Please note that this type of rotation (of the observer around his or her own axis
towards the object array) is different from the rotation variant of the relative FoR,
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2010). This assumption authorizes the point-symmetric pattern
for future and past responses proposed here (e.g., the diagnosis of
a reflection variant of the relative FoR if events both in the past and
the future are “moved forward” toward the present; cf. Table 1).
Whether this rotation assumption really holds in the temporal
domain needs to be scrutinized more thoroughly in light of new
findings on dorsal references (i.e., for spatial arrays in one’s back),
for which rotation was not observed (at least not in the settings
examined in Beller et al., under review).
Bearing these uncertainties in mind, we re-classified the
responses people gave in our previous experiments according to
whether the entities were moved away from or toward the observer.
As we wanted the spatial and the temporal tasks to be as similar
as possible (i.e., with the relevant entities all arranged along one
dimension) and to be independent of the rotation assumption, we
considered for re-analysis only those two spatial layouts from the
data reported in Beller et al. (under review), in which figure F and
ground object G were arranged in one line with the observer and in
which the objects were in the observer’s visual field. We then com-
puted the mean frequency of assigning front to the side of G that
was oriented either away from (further) or toward the observer
(nearer). From the temporal data reported in Bender et al. (2010),
we considered only those tasks in which the movement took place
in the observer’s subjective future (so as to avoid the question
of observer rotation), and we classified this movement as either
futurewards (further away from the present) or pastwards (nearer
to the present).
While these two readings (further/nearer) can be directly gener-
ated from the FoRs in Table 2, they are less discriminative than the
FoRs. Interestingly, though, consistency across domains increased
only slightly by this recoding (see Table 3 and Figure 2). A con-
sistent pattern with a strong preference for assigning front in
the same direction across both the spatial and temporal tasks was
detected only in one of the four languages (German), while in the
other three languages a predominance of one FoR either in the
spatial or temporal tasks was paired with a mixed assignment of
front (around 50%) in the other task, respectively3.
Yet, even these findings cannot count as conclusive evidence
against a close link between spatial and temporal references. The
spatial data used for this comparison was collected with table-top
stationary objects, whereas the temporal data originate from the
interpretation of where to an event is moved. This implies a crucial
difference between the two settings: while the first setting is static,
the second is dynamic. At least for USA-English, however, there is
some evidence that people’s preferences may shift from static to
dynamic settings (Hill, 1978, 1982; for a theoretical distinction of
static and dynamic settings, see also Tenbrink, 2011). To solve this
issue and assess the extent to which the FoRs underlying the spatial
reading of “moving forward” also affect its temporal reading, we
decided to compare people’s responses in a spatial and a temporal
task both of which are dynamic.
in which the coordinate system is transferred from V into G, by way of rotating it
in G.
3Except for Germany, the proportion of “further” responses in the temporal tasks is
significantly different from the proportion of “further”in the spatial tasks (Germany:
p = 447; all other countries: p < 001; according to the binomial distribution).
Table 3 | Percentage of individuals assigning FRONT either further
away from or nearer to the observer in (a) the spatial and (b) the
temporal tasks.
Direction of FRONT Country
Germany USA China Tonga
(a) Space1 (N =69) (N =66) (N =32) (N =50)
Further 10.9 22.7 43.7 73.0
Nearer 89.1 77.3 56.3 27.0
(b) Time2 (N =120) (N =144) (N =163) (N =120)
Further (futurewards) 10.0 50.0 3.7 55.8
Nearer (pastwards) 90.0 50.0 96.3 44.2
1Data from Beller et al. (under review), frontal condition, two tasks with non-
intrinsic objects arranged in one line.
2Data from Bender et al. (2010, p. 299), event in the future.
0
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of individuals assigning FRONT further away
from the observer in space and time (cf.Table 3).
EXPERIMENT
The experiment consisted of two parts. The goal of Part 1 was to
scrutinize whether preferences for spatial FoRs in any of the four
languages under scrutiny (i.e., German, USA-English, Mandarin
Chinese, and Tongan) change if speakers refer to dynamic instead
of static spatial constellations. Comparing this new data with the
one reported in Table 2 allows us to assess whether the corre-
spondence between spatial and temporal preferences increases if
the conditions under which they are elicited are more equivalent
(dynamic settings).
Part 2 aimed at examining which reading of moving forward
speakers of USA-English prefer in spatial as contrasted to tem-
poral contexts. English is the one language in our sample that
provides the exact same vocabulary (“moving X forward”) for
spatial and temporal expressions, and whose speakers exhibit sub-
stantial intra-linguistic variance in their adoption of FoRs both in
spatial and temporal tasks (Beller et al., under review; Rothe-Wulf
et al., under review). Assessing to what extent individual readings
of “moving X forward” co-vary across space and time is thus par-
ticularly promising for our US participants: will they adopt the
same FoR to construe temporal descriptions as they do for spatial
descriptions? Such a co-variation, if it occurred, would then also
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help to explain the inter-individual variability in the responses to
the Wednesday’s meeting task found in the USA.
METHODS
Materials
Two types of tasks were used (four questions each), one for assess-
ing the preferred spatial reading (s-FoR) of the verb “moving
forward” (Part 1), and the other for assessing the preferred t-FoR
(Part 2).
Part 1. In order to assess participants’ spatial reading, two pairs
of pictures were used, each depicting one situation in a game: Mills
(also known as Nine Men’s Morris) and Chess. Participants were
asked to mark in the picture, where to they would move a par-
ticular game piece. For the two target pictures (see Table 4) the
instruction asked to “move the front piece one position forward”
(Mills) or to “move the white rook two squares forward” (Chess),
respectively; the instruction also depicted a white rook to facilitate
token identification. The other two pictures requested sidewards
or diagonal movement and served as filler items.
Mills and Chess differ in one crucial aspect, namely their
inherent orientation: as Mills is played by placing round tokens
alternatively on any node of the grid, anywhere on the board, both
the tokens and the board lack an intrinsic front. In contrast,
Chess more explicitly resembles a combat game in which – at least
in the beginning – both sides are opposed to each other and in
which some tokens such as the pawns have a predefined moving
direction (i.e., toward the other side of the board). Furthermore,
in depictions of Chess constellations, the white side is canoni-
cally the one nearer to the observer. Contrasting these two games
aimed at assessing the additional effect of such an intrinsic ori-
entation on FoR adoption. Such an effect, however, is expected to
occur only if people are familiar with the rules of the game (which
we inquired after completion of the tasks). If they are not familiar,
both depictions alike should be regarded as basically non-oriented,
which would then dampen any possible effects of game orienta-
tion. Please also note that the Mills task allows us to assess the
preferred s-FoR in both a static and a dynamic context at the
same time: picking the “front piece” (static) requires the assign-
ment of front as much as does “moving it forward” (dynamic;
see Table 1).
All materials were presented in the participants’ native lan-
guages. The phrase “moving forward” was translated into German
as nach vorne schieben, into Chinese as xiàng qián yí, and into
Tongan as teke ki mu’a. These phrases use the same (or cognate)
prepositions as the temporal ones, but not all of them use the same
verbs. In temporal contexts, the translations for “moving forward”
was identical in Chinese (xiàng qián yí), but different in German
(vorverlegen) and Tongan (matolo ki mu’a)4.
Part 2 (USA only). In order to assess the temporal reading, two
pairs of questions of the following type were used: “The meeting
scheduled for Wednesday next week will be moved forward 2 days.
On which day of the week will it now take place?” Each pair of
4Of course, when people are aware of the ambiguity in these terms, they may choose
unambiguous expressions such as “moving X to an earlier or later date”.
questions consisted of a future event and a past event. One pair
of questions used the time scale days of the week with a time span
of 2 days for moving the event, the other pair used the time scale
time of the day with a time span of 3 h for moving the event (type
of event, time of event, and time scale were counterbalanced).
Crucially, all questions had the same structure, instantiating a
ternary relation between (exemplified for Wednesday’s meeting
question) ground G=Wednesday, figure F= date of resched-
uled meeting, and (optional) observer’s viewpoint V= speaker’s
present.
An absolute t-FoR is assigned when both past and future events
are “moved forward” toward the future, an intrinsic t-FoR is
assigned when they are both moved toward the past, and a relative
t-FoR is assigned when they are moved symmetrically with regard
to the subjective present (i.e., translation when being “moved for-
ward” means further away toward past or future, respectively, and
reflection when being moved closer toward the present; cf. Table 1,
last two columns; and see Bender et al., 2010; Rothe-Wulf et al.,
under review).
Participants
The sample consisted of 137 German students (101 female) from
Freiburg University (mean age 24.9 years, SD= 7.0), 137 USA stu-
dents (88 female) from the Pennsylvania State University (mean
age 21.1 years, SD= 4.3), 70 Chinese students (21 female) from
Tongji University (mean age 20.5 years, SD= 2.1), and 116 Ton-
gan students (68 female) from Ha‘apai High School (mean age
16.4 years, SD= 1.1).
Design and procedure
The Mills and Chess tasks were each presented blockwise, and in
one of two orders. The tasks were presented in a booklet, printed
one each on a page. Although participants were not instructed on
how to hold the booklet when responding, the booklet itself likely
normalized the direction of viewing (i.e., with the spine of the
booklet to the left and the top of the page further away from the
participant). The tasks reported here were part of a larger survey,
in which participants first worked on referencing tasks for static
settings (reported in Beller et al., under review), and then on the
four dynamic tasks reported here. If carry over effects from the
static to the dynamic settings were to occur, they should render
the latter more similar to the former ones.
The temporal tasks were presented in the USA sample only (for
the reasons given above), and before the spatial tasks. The latter
is justified by the fact that spatial representations may affect tem-
poral reasoning, but not the other way around (Boroditsky, 2000;
Casasanto and Boroditsky, 2008; Casasanto et al., 2010).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We will first analyze the spatial data across the four countries
(Part 1) and then the relation between space and time in the USA
(Part 2).
Part 1: spatial tasks
For the analysis of the spatial data, we excluded those participants,
who did not indicate unambiguously which piece they had moved
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Table 4 | Percentages of individuals choosing the further/nearer piece as “the front piece” in the Mills task [(A), bold-faced], and percentages of
individuals moving the chosen piece further away from or nearer toward them [(A) Mills and (B) Chess].
Task Instruction Country
Move X forward Germany USA China Tonga
(A) Mills X= the front piece (n=134) (n=108) (n=59) (n=66)
(a) X= further piece 25.4 43.5 79.7 90.9
Further 24.6 34.3 76.3 66.7
Nearer 0.8 9.2 3.4 24.2
(b) X=nearer piece 74.6 56.5 20.3 9.1
Further 50.7 38.9 8.5 7.6
Nearer 23.9 17.6 11.8 1.5
(a)
(b)
further
nearer
(B) Chess (n=137) (n=136) (n=62) (n=74)
X= the white rook
Further 83.9 90.4 85.5 91.9
Nearer 16.1 9.6 14.5 8.1
further
nearer
(in the Mills task only5), and those who performed a movement
to the left or to the right (in Mills or Chess). For the remaining
participants, we determined whether the piece chosen was moved
further away from or nearer toward them (Table 4).
The Mills task combines a static question (“which piece is cho-
sen as the front piece?”) with a dynamic question (“in which
direction is it moved forward?”). With regard to the static question,
choosing the piece nearer to the observer as“the front piece”corre-
sponds to the reflection (or rotation) variant of the relative s-FoR,
whereas choosing the piece further away from the observer corre-
sponds to the translation variant6. The preferences for one or the
other piece (Table 4, percentages printed in bold) differ substan-
tially between countries (χ2= 99.1; df= 3; p< 0.001; N = 367)
and are in line with our previous results (cf. Tables 2 and 3): in
Germany, the preference for the nearer piece (further: 25.4% vs.
nearer: 74.6%) is consistent with the reflection variant; the pref-
erence for the further away piece in China (further: 79.7% vs.
nearer: 20.3%) and in Tonga (further: 90.9% vs. nearer: 9.1%)
reveals the translation variant; and the results in the USA (fur-
ther: 43.5% vs. nearer: 56.5%) indicate that the reflective reading
slightly dominates the translational one.
With regard to the dynamic question (“in which direction is
the piece moved forward?”), the picture looks quite different:
5In the Mills task, some participants either had given no answer or had marked the
center of the board without indicating the piece that had been moved.
6One might also argue that identifying the figure F in this task could be resolved
with an intrinsic FoR that originates in Ego (as ground G), with the “front piece”
simply being “the piece in front of Ego”. However, as there is more than one piece
involved – all of which are “in front of Ego” and thus qualify as front pieces in this
sense – disambiguating the one that is more in front requires consideration also of
the relation between these different pieces, which renders the group of non-figure
pieces the ground. In consequence, the relation under scrutiny is a ternary relation
and therefore requires the relative FoR.
here, we found no differences between countries, as indicated by
a log-linear analysis (Kennedy, 1992) with “direction of move-
ment” as dependent variable (main effect “country”: G2= 6.0;
df= 3; p= 0.112). Instead, the direction of movement depended
on which piece was chosen as “the front piece” (main effect
“piece”: G2= 15.7; df= 1; p< 0.001) and was modulated to some
extent by the country as indicated by a significant interaction
(“country× piece”: G2= 16.1; df= 3; p= 0.001).
Across all four countries, we found a clear preference for a
translational reading, that is, for moving the piece further away
from the observer (further: 76.0% vs. nearer: 24.0%; χ2= 99.4;
df= 1; p< 0.001; N = 367). In China and Tonga, references in
the dynamic setting are thus consistent with those in the static
settings (both translation), whereas in the USA and particularly
in Germany, they are not. Here, in line with Hill’s (1978, 1982)
observations, the switch from a static to a dynamic setting was
sufficient to switch the preferences from reflection to translation
or from a “nearer” to a “further away” positioning (as depicted
in Figure 3). Overall, the preference for the translational read-
ing was even stronger for participants who had chosen the piece
further away according to the translation variant (further: 84.6%
vs. nearer: 15.4%; n= 188) than for participants who had chosen
the piece nearer toward them (further: 67.0% vs. nearer: 33.0%;
n= 179). This indicates at least a tendency for being consistent
in the static and dynamic aspect, which varies, however, between
the four countries: it is strongest in China (88.1% consistent
choices), followed by Tonga (68.2%), the USA (51.9%), and Ger-
many (48.5%). In other words, roughly half of the participants in
the USA and Germany applied different spatial FoRs for static as
opposed to dynamic settings.
The Chess task entails only the dynamic aspect (i.e., the direc-
tion in which the piece is moved), but no static aspect. On the
other hand, it allows us to assess an additional effect of an intrinsic
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FIGURE 3 | Percentage of individuals assigning FRONT further away
from the observer in the static and the dynamic tasks (cf.Table 4).
front assigned to the token. As noted above, the two settings dif-
fer in that Chess does, but Mills does not contain an inherent
orientation; being white, the rook depicted in this task is intrin-
sically oriented toward the side of the black tokens. Similar to
the Mills task, we found a strong preference for a reading as fur-
ther (87.8%) over nearer (12.2%; χ2= 233.5; df= 1; p< 0.001;
N = 409) with no differences between countries; χ2= 4.2; df= 3;
p= 0.236; N = 409 (see Table 4). Presumably due to the intrin-
sic orientation of the white rook, this reading is even more
pronounced than in the Mills task7.
Across both tasks, speakers of all four languages generally pre-
ferred the same s-FoR in the dynamic settings: translation. This
immediately reveals that the correspondence between preferences
for spatial and temporal FoRs has not increased by making the con-
ditions more similar. To the contrary: with Germany and China,
we now have two cases with just opposite preferences for assign-
ing front in spatial and temporal movements: further away from
the observer in space and nearer toward the observer in time (see
Figure 4 in comparison to Figure 2). In the USA, the preference
in spatial tasks has changed from “nearer” to “further”; only the
Tongan pattern, while exhibiting a significant difference, does not
accumulate to an inversion of preferences8.
Part 2: temporal tasks
As a last resort for establishing cross-domain consistency, we tested
co-variation of preferences for s-FoR and t-FoR on an individual
level among our USA participants. Do individual speakers, who
read the spatial “moving forward” of objects as further away from
themselves (and thus as translational), also prefer the translational
reading in time, and vice versa? As we have seen above, our USA
participants predominantly chose the translational FoR in the spa-
tial dynamic tasks. In contrast, the vast majority of FoRs adopted
7Of course, the intrinsic orientation in Chess can only come to bear on FoR choice
if it is known, but this was the case in almost all samples. In contrast, the lack of
acquaintance with the Mills task, in all but the German sample, should have no
effect, as an intrinsic reading is not possible in either case. And indeed, the German
results for the dynamic subtask do not differ significantly from the results of the
other groups (χ2 = 3.1 df = 3; p = 377; N = 367).
8In all four countries, the difference between the frequency of the “further” response
in the temporal and the spatial tasks are statistically significant (Germany, USA, and
China: p < 001; Tonga: p = 017; Fisher’s exact test, 2-tailed).
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FIGURE 4 | Percentage of individuals assigning FRONT further away
from the observer in space (Mills task, cf.Table 4) and time (cf.Table 3).
in the temporal tasks split almost evenly between absolute (38%)
and intrinsic (36%), as defined in Table 1 (i.e., participants either
gave pastwards or futurewards responses, respectively9).
While this latter finding is entirely in line with the general pat-
tern as documented in the literature (e.g., McGlone and Harding,
1998), the underlying classification of response patterns into (t-)
FoRs may not be unequivocal. As on page 4 above, we therefore also
tested the simpler question of whether individual speakers, who
read the “moving forward” of objects as further away from them-
selves, also prefer the futurewards reading in time (event moved
further away). To answer this question, we analyzed the corre-
spondence between participants’ moving direction in the Mills
task (with the spatial array in the person’s visual field) and in
two of the temporal tasks (those with an event in the future).
If people choose front consistently across space and time, we
would expect a high proportion of futurewards movements (fur-
ther away from present) for the group of participants (n= 79) who
made a (translational) movement further away from observer in
the spatial task, and a high proportion of pastwards movements
(nearer toward present) for the group of participants (n= 29)
who made a (reflective) movement nearer toward observer in the
spatial task. The data, however, do not support this hypothesis:
the two groups did not differ in the mean frequency of past-
wards (nearer) movements in the temporal task [53.8 vs. 50.0%;
t (106)= 0.376, p= 0.707], and the correlation between spatial
and temporal movement directions is close to zero (r =−0.037,
p= 0.354, N = 108). In other words, even if the tasks are made as
similar as possible to each other, the FoRs adopted for space and
time (at least in the USA) appear to be entirely independent of
each other.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The prime goal of this study was to examine whether the prefer-
ences for a specific FoR in spatial contexts would carry over to the
temporal domain. Given the large body of research attesting to the
link between space and time, we expected this to be the case (cf.
Bender et al., 2010).
9The relative FoRs prevailing in the spatial tasks are adopted (in a consistent man-
ner) only exceptionally in temporal tasks (reflective FoR: 5%; translational FoR:
1%) – which defies any possibility for cross-domain correspondence.
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Our current findings, however, are rather discouraging in this
regard. Not only did we find no correspondence between tem-
poral and spatial references in the four languages under scrutiny,
we did not even find a hint of correlation in the one case that
was most promising, USA-English. In this language, the very same
phrase (“moving X forward”) can be used to construct similar
spatial and temporal tasks; and in both domains, this phrase gives
rise to considerable inter-individual variability due to its inherent
ambiguity (Beller et al., under review; Rothe-Wulf et al., under
review). In addition, the USA participants even worked on the
temporal and the spatial task consecutively. If anything, then this
should have made set effects more likely, thus increasing – at least
slightly – the homogeneity in FoR adoption across domains. And
yet, their spatial and temporal readings of “moving X forward” did
not co-vary at all.
Again, we cannot entirely exclude that our taxonomy of tempo-
ral FoRs is inappropriate, despite its thorough conceptual ground-
ing. In order to address respective doubts regarding how we cat-
egorized response patterns into t-FoRs, we therefore re-coded the
responses according to the simpler distinction in moving direc-
tions (nearer/further). But still, the lack of consistency across
domains persists.
This finding not only contradicts our own expectations, but
also appears to be in contrast to the findings reported in the intro-
duction according to which representations of space and time do
interact, sometimes in rather intricate and complex manners (e.g.,
when watching the moving of squares on a screen affects responses
to temporal tasks). So, why do we find no carry-over from space
to time in this rather simple case?10
Several reasons are conceivable. One could be that the spa-
tial and temporal settings used in our tasks still differ in crucial
aspects. For instance, moving a game token one or two positions
forward surely constitutes a small-scale setting, whereas moving
an event like a meeting or flight departure forward by hours or
even days might be regarded as a large-scale setting, and people
are well known to be sensitive to such distinctions (Bennardo,
2000; Levinson, 2003).
Another questionable assumption regarding comparability is
whether temporal ground objects can be conceived of as having
an intrinsic front or not (and opinions in this regard differ largely
among scholars; e.g., Bender et al., 2010;Yu, 2012; vs. Zinken, 2010;
Tenbrink, 2011). This is related to the concern that the orientation
inherent specifically in our Chess task may have overshadowed the
patterns otherwise to be expected in the spatial tasks (i.e., prevail-
ingly a relative FoR). We do think that this is partly the case (and
this was why we contrasted a non-directional game like Mills with
a directional one like Chess in the first place). However, the com-
parison of the Mills and the Chess task, and specifically the lack
of substantial differences between the two tasks, encourages us to
interpret the data of these two tasks indeed as indicative of a rela-
tive FoR. But clearly, this hypothesis calls for further investigation
in future research.
10What renders matters even more disturbing is the fact, that even when priming
the spatial FoRs, we had difficulties to obtain any effect on how US participants
responded to the “moving Wednesday’s meeting” task (Rothe, Beller, and Bender,
submission).
Previous studies that explored the culture-specificity of cross-
domain mapping targeted (non-Western) speech communities
with a documented preference for the absolute FoR in spatial con-
texts. Setting absolute FoRs in contrast to the intrinsic and/or
the relative FoRs arguably resembles a more coarse-grained inves-
tigation of this mapping than our investigation that embraced
all possible FoRs. It could thus be, as was argued by one of the
reviewers for this paper, that spatial and temporal conceptions
may simply not map thoroughly enough to produce co-variation at
this level of inspection. Given the range of both static and dynamic
settings mustered for our comparison and the variety of response
coding (both as FoRs and as simple further/nearer direction), it
remains puzzling, though, that absolutely no co-variation emerged
for the USA participants, whose temporal references do co-vary
with different – and occasionally superficial – manipulations (e.g.,
Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002; Kranjec, 2006; Núñez et al., 2006;
Weger and Pratt, 2008).
Another reason for the observed lack of cross-domain consis-
tency could be that (cultural) preferences for one reading over the
other may arise differently for different domains. Just as speakers
of closely related languages come up with different FoR preferences
for disambiguating the same underspecified phrase (Rothe-Wulf
et al., under review), so may speakers of one and the same language
come up with different FoR preferences for the same phrase in dif-
ferent contexts and/or domains. Given that assignment of front
for underspecified phrases is always an arbitrary act – depending
on the perspective one takes – other cultural factors may sim-
ply override a tendency toward cross-domain consistency (if such
a tendency ever existed in the first place). The observation that
preferences do switch from reflection (in static) to translation (in
dynamic) tasks in Germany and the USA lends some empirical
support to this assumption.
This would also help to explain, at least to some extent, the
discrepancy between other studies and our own regarding cross-
domain consistency in FoR preferences. Let’s assume that prefer-
ences for FoRs do differ for space and time and do not normally
carry over across domains. If a task then demands to solve tempo-
ral references, people are likely to adopt that FoR they typically
prefer in such cases. If, on the other hand, the task requires
a response that contains not only a temporal, but also a spa-
tial dimension, then spatial FoRs need to be considered as well.
For instance, the co-speech gestures documented by Núñez and
colleagues (Núñez and Sweetser, 2006; Cooperrider and Núñez,
2009; Núñez et al., 2012) or by Le Guen and Pool Balam (2012)
are necessarily spatial in nature, regardless of the domain they
refer to – and this apparently poses a problem to the Yucatec
Maya, who do not intend to indicate spatial meaning when talk-
ing about time (cf. Le Guen and Pool Balam, 2012). Likewise,
abstract pointing and card arrangement tasks (as used, e.g., by
Boroditsky and Gaby, 2010; Brown, 2012; Gaby, 2012) also con-
tain a spatial dimension. In all these cases, the cross-domain
consistency (if it occurred) could be attributed to this shared
spatial dimension. In other words: the FoR preferences exhibited
by the responses in the (temporal) tasks would then be consis-
tent with the FoR preferences in spatial contexts simply because
the spatial aspects of the response follows from the conventions
of the spatial domain only. In contrast, the FoR adopted for
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disambiguating a temporal expression (as in our study) follows
from the conventions of the temporal domain, which could be
independent of the spatial ones. A similar conclusion has been
drawn in a recent review on the comparison of Mandarin and
English which argues that the relationship between spatial and
temporal languages and reasoning is a rather complex one, and
one that varies with a range of factors (Chen and O’Seaghdha, in
press).
A stronger version of the above argument (that FoR preferences
may be domain- and perhaps even task-specific) would be to claim
that the speakers of the languages under scrutiny here do not adopt
any FoR, but simply follow linguistic conventions engrained in, or
contributing to, the semantics of the words – a claim often raised
in discussions on these issues. However, if this was true, this argu-
ment should hold for spatial as much as for temporal contexts.
The whole concept of FoRs and each concern with it would then
be entirely meaningless. The very fact that the reading of phrases
like “moving forward” differs across speakers, tasks, and settings –
in other words: that speakers seem to change their reading upon
the slightest modification of boundary conditions – justifies the
assumption that they in fact do switch perspectives which, in turn,
indicates that they do adopt a FoR, in time as much as in space.
Given the evidence against the use of corresponding FoRs across
domains, should we continue to put effort into our attempts to
generate a systematic mapping of one onto the other? We are
convinced that the current findings render this endeavor indeed
even more important. The conceptual link between these two
domains appears to vary across levels of representation and pro-
cessing. Cross-domain comparisons could help to assess at which
level, to what extent, and under which conditions preferences
for FoRs in space are also reflected in time. Such cross-domain
comparisons, however, presuppose a consistent and comprehen-
sive mapping of FoR taxonomies, which therefore remains one
of the crucial preconditions for moving forward in this field of
research.
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